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Abstract: This article analyzes Korea’s central agencies, which have been orga-
nized and reorganized to support presidential executive leadership since the
foundation of the Republic. Each central agency has carried out the standardiza-
tion of a core administrative function which is essential to the operation of
administrative apparatuses, including policy planning and coordination, budget-
ing, organizing, staffing, legislation, public relations, central-local relations, con-
trol and performance evaluation, etc. The six decades of institutionalization can
be characterized, based on the central agencies’ proportion of the total adminis-
trative apparatus, into three phases: high (more than 35 percent, 1948-1961),
middle (around 20 percent, 1962-2007), and low (about 10 percent, 2008-pre-
sent). Regardless of the changing size and organizational configuration of the
central agencies, however, their roles and influence as core executive apparatus-
es have remained largely unchanged, especially since the early 1960s. More than
67 percent, on average, of the heads and deputy heads of CAs have been former
public servants, less than 18 percent have been former politicians, and about 15
percent have been former outside experts. This strong bureaucratic background
has oriented Korea’s core executive policy direction significantly toward long-
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term, consistent, and plan rationality rather than short-term, flexible, and democ-
ratic responsiveness.
Keywords: central agency, core executive, institutional presidency in Korea,
Korean state administration
INTRODUCTION
One of the institutional characteristics of the Korean state administration is the sig-
nificant development of central agencies (CA). A number of CA, with the title of
board, ministry, agency, or office, have been organized or reorganized under the presi-
dent or the prime minister, and have effectively supported presidential leadership since
the foundation of the Republic.
In the Western literature, CA are defined as the “departments, agencies, and offices
[that] perform the functions [which are] essential to co-ordination and control of
bureaucracy throughout government” (Campbell, 1983, p. 3) and “perform functions
which directly affect all other government departments . . . often co-ordinate the inter-
departmental development of policy . . . frequently develop policies which other
departments must follow, in fields such as expenditure control and personnel manage-
ment . . . [and] often monitor the performance of other departments” (Campbell &
Szablowski, 1979, p. 2). This definition implies that the CA include all the core execu-
tive apparatuses. This article, however, differentiates the CA from the Presidential
Secretariat, which has also been significantly developed as another important part of
Korea’s core executive apparatuses.
The CA are regarded as the organizations that conduct executive or administrative
functions that the chief executive is in charge of (Bernard, 1938; Gulick, 1937, p. 13),
or as a “technostructure” to support the “strategic apex” with standardizing organiza-
tional operations (Mintzberg, 1979). Each CA carries out the standardization of core
administrative functions that are essential to the operation of administrative appara-
tuses—such as policy planning and coordination, budgeting, organizing, staffing,
managing the relationship between central and local government, legislation, public
relations, controlling, and performance evaluation.1 By intervening in the operations
of all administrative apparatuses through these standardizations, they ultimately sup-
22 Institutional Change and Continuity in Korea’s Central Agencies, 1948-2011
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
1. In the Canadian federal government, there are at least five CA: the Prime Minister’s Office,
the Privy Council Office, the Federal-Provincial Relations Office, the Financial Department,
and the Treasury Board Secretariat (Campbell & Szablowski, 1979).
port the core executive leadership directly or indirectly.
Since the CA standardize and control the key administrative functions essential to
the operation of the administrative apparatuses, the latter are inevitably subordinate to
the former in terms of real authority. In general, the CA stands “above other depart-
ments in that it performs functions which are thought to be crucial to the common
interests of government departments, and which relate to matters of major impor-
tance” (Campbell & Szablowski, 1979, p. 2). In the case of Korea, they work closely
with the senior secretaries to the president in the Presidential Secretariat, and effective-
ly support the president by standardizing and controlling the key administrative func-
tions of other administrative apparatuses. Moreover, the personnel of some of the CA
are given positions or grades on par with or higher than ordinary administrative appa-
ratuses. Such higher grades or positions have given the personnel of the CA higher
rank than those of other administrative apparatuses with which they interact.
This article explores the institutionalization of the CA in Korea during the past six
decades, by analyzing how much the core executive apparatuses have acquired auton-
omy with well-boundedness from the external environment, durability, intra-organiza-
tional complexity or differentiation, and legitimacy with authority over other adminis-
trative organizations.2
FUNCTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
Policy Planning, Coordination, and Evaluation
The president needs to understand and supervise policy initiatives that are planned
by the administrative apparatuses. He needs also to steer and coordinate the policies of
each ministry and agency in the direction of the overall national policy that he pursues.
Over the years, Korean presidents have been supported in their executive leadership
on policy planning, coordination, and evaluation by the following CA: the Ministry of
Planning, Ministry of Construction, Economic Planning Board, Board of Finance and
Economy, Ministry/Commission of Planning and Budget, and Ministry of Strategy
and Finance (figure 1).
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2. For the concept of institutionalization, see Selznick, 1957; Huntington, 1968, p. 12; Polsby,
1968; Canon, 1989; and Ragsdale & Theis, 1997.
The first central planning apparatus was the Ministry of Planning, which was
established under the prime minister in 1948 in accordance with the National Govern-
ment Organization Act (1948). The planning function at the time only dealt with short-
term planning and budgeting, and it was mainly focused on how to ration American
aid goods (Cho, 1969; Kang, Rhee, & Choi, 2008). Because the Korean government
lacked experience in national planning, it relied on foreign experts to devise develop-
ment plans until 1954; afterward, the Ministry of Planning and the Ministry of Recon-
struction set up a Five-Year Economic Development Plan.
The constitutional amendment of 1955 abolished the Ministry of Planning along
with the prime minister’s position, and the Ministry of Reconstruction was established
instead. At the time, however, the budgeting function was transferred to the Ministry
of Finance, hence the Ministry of Reconstruction did not have many effective tools for
realizing its plans. It was hardly possible for the Ministry of Reconstruction to conduct
planning functions in a situation in which the socioeconomic infrastructure was weak,
and President Syngman Rhee did not show much interest in long-term national devel-
opment planning.
The Chung-hee Park administration, which took office promising rapid economic
growth, integrated the planning and budgeting function under the Economic Planning
Board (EPB) (1961-1994) in order to effectively initiate and execute development
planning. The EPB steered and coordinated six Five-year Economic Development
Plans starting in 1962, with strong support from the president. President Park person-
ally presided over a monthly economic trend report meeting with related ministers,
hosted by the EPB to build a consensus with economic development players; this gave
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Figure 1. Organizational Configurations of the Policy Planning, Coordination, and Evaluation 
Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOP = Ministry of Planning; MOC = Ministry of Construction; EPB = Economic Planning Board; BOFE = Board of
Finance and Economy; M(C)OPB = Ministry (Commission) of Planning and Budget; MOSF = Ministry of Strategy and
Finance.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
power to the Board. He also actively hosted export-promoting conferences, with par-
ticipants from the public, private, and academic spheres, to implement export-led eco-
nomic development plans (Kang et al., 2008). He also elevated the position of the
minister of the EPB to deputy prime minister (a higher position than that of other min-
isters), which made the EPB superior in rank to other administrative apparatuses with
which it interacted, and delegated to it a comprehensive coordinating authority on
financial matters, so that it could conduct overall economic policy with authority over
other agencies.3
During this period, President Park also established an Office of Planning and Coor-
dination within each ministry to communicate effectively with the EPB and supervise
planning functions within the ministry. The EPB continually expanded its sub-struc-
ture, staff, and functions—including policy planning and coordination, budgeting, and
evaluation. In addition to the president’s full support, the differentiation of the EPB’s
administrative resources contributed greatly to increasing its autonomy.
The EPB was provided with strong instruments for policy coordination by utilizing
the power to conduct budget reviews and distribute foreign capital to other ministries
(Kang et al., 2008, p. 249). Being relatively independent from interest groups, unlike
most line ministries and agencies, the EPB was also able to form an image of itself as
the “pilot agency” that was concerned with overall national development; this allowed
it to further strengthen its legitimacy.
The role of the EPB was gradually reduced, however, after the 1980s, when neolib-
eral ideology and democratization progressed. In December 1994, the Young-sam
Kim administration merged the EPB with the Ministry of Finance to create the Board
of Finance and Economy (1994-1998), in the name of responding effectively to sege-
hwa or globalization. Afterward, the function of national development planning was
weakened, and the Presidential Secretariat began to manage policy planning and coor-
dination more directly, by creating many ad hoc advisory committees such as the
Segehwa (Globalization) Promotion Committee.
In 1998, right after the liquidity crisis and the ensuing economic recession, the
Ministry of Planning and Budget (MOPB) (1998-2008)4 was established to resurrect
the EPB. However, the mission of the MOPB was different from that of the EPB: it
served as a pilot agency that led pro-market reform policies rather than government-
led economic development policies (Jung, 2010). Moreover, as Korea recovered from
the financial crisis, the role of the MOPB became more focused on budgeting and
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3. The Board of Finance and Economy (1994-1998), the EPB’s successor, retained the same
rank.
4. The MOPB began as the Commission of Planning and Budget (1998-1999).
financial policy coordination, whereas important policy planning functions were grad-
ually managed by the Presidential Secretariat. In 2008, the Myung-bak Lee adminis-
tration merged the MOPB with the Ministry of Finance and Economy (1998-2008) to
launch the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (2008-present).
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) also served as a CA for policy coordination
and evaluation. The PMO operated without any legal basis from 1948 to 1955, and
then was abolished from 1955 to 1960, when the prime minister’s position was
removed by constitutional amendment. Under the parliamentary government set up in
1960, the PMO was reestablished, but the cabinet office (named the State Council
Secretariat) was established and become the most important CA, as was the case in
most countries with parliamentary government. During the Bo-seon Yoon presidency
(1960-1962), there was the position of the Secretary of National Defense, directly
responsible to the president, who was also the commander-in-chief (Article 61 of the
Constitution of the Second Republic) and could declare war with the vote of the
National Assembly (Article 57).
In 1963, when a presidential executive system was institutionalized again, the
PMO was reestablished, with a legal basis for the first time, in a revision of the
National Government Organization Act. From the viewpoint of complexity, the PMO
was somewhat more differentiated in 1966, and its infrastructure was stipulated more
clearly in 1998 by presidential decrees. Considering its discontinuity and weak legal
basis, the PMO can be evaluated as having had low durability (an important compo-
nent of institutionalization) at the beginning of the Republic, but its legal status has
been maintained since it was reestablished in 1960.
Depending on the political and personal relations between president and prime
minister, there were some changes in the PMO in terms of autonomy and complexity.
In 1963, for example, the Park administration established the Office of Planning and
Coordination, which was directly responsible to the prime minister. Under Prime Min-
ister Jong-Pil Kim (1973-1977), who was one of the closest comrades of President
Park, the function of the Office of Planning and Coordination was strengthened by
being provided with five director-general-level coordinator positions. During the same
period, the Office for Administrative Coordination was newly established under the
prime minister with five director-general-level coordinator positions.
In 1994, President Young-sam Kim let the head of the PMO chair the vice-ministe-
rial meeting, which played an important role in the public policy process in Korea
(Jung, 1996). Since 1998, the position of the head of the PMO, which was renamed
the Office of Government Policy Coordination, has been elevated to be on a par with
ministers. President Kim also put the PMO in charge of the secretariat of the Presiden-
tial Committee for Administrative Reform (PCAR, 1993-1998), and let the head of the
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PMO become a member of the PCAR as well as chair of the Expert Committee under
the PCAR.
During the Dae-joong Kim administration (1998-2003), the PCAR was reorga-
nized to become the Regulatory Reforms Committee, which was assisted by the PMO.
The PMO has been also in charge of policy evaluation and performance management,
supporting the Policy Evaluation Committee (1998-2006), and then the Government
Performance Evaluation Committee (since 2006), as secretariat. These committees
were institutionalized based on the Framework Act on the Evaluation of Government
Performance (passed in 1998) and the Framework Act on Government Performance
Evaluation (passed in 2006) (Jung, 2007). The addition of such functions to the PMO
with a legal basis has enhanced substantially not only its differentiation but also auton-
omy and durability.
When the Myung-bak Lee administration (2008 to present) was launched, it con-
ducted an administrative reform on the principle of small government, which mini-
mized the functions of the PMO. The above-mentioned law-based functions of regula-
tory reform and government performance evaluation have been maintained, but the
policy coordination functions, which the PMO had been in charge of since the 1960s,
were minimized. Since the so-called candlelight protest led by civic groups in spring
2008, however, the role of prime minister and the PMO have been expanding again.
The overall size of the intra-organizations and staff has maintained or increased, with
only a short-term reduction of staff in 2008 (figures 2 and 3), showing the durability of
the PMO since 1963.
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Figure 2. Organizational Configuration of the Prime Minister’s Office, 1963-2011
Note: The Administrative Reform Committee (1973-1981) and the National Emergency Planning Committee (1986-2007) are
included in this figure
Source: Adapted from Jung, Kwon, & Kim, 2002.
To summarize, until the early 1960s, the institutionalization level of the CA in
charge of policy planning and coordination was low in terms of durability, autonomy,
and legitimacy. It was under the Park administration that their institutionalization was
maximized, due to the government-led economic development strategy. Since the
early 1990s, the durability and autonomy of the policy planning function gradually
weakened. This was caused mainly by the decrease in the need for state-led develop-
mental planning as the Korean economy advanced. Policy planning and coordination
tended to be conducted more and more directly by the Presidential Secretariat and the
ad hoc presidential advisory committees, in order to effectively initiate and monitor
the policy promises that the president made during the election campaign.
Budgeting
Government policy initiatives cannot be implemented without financial support.
That is why intervening in budgeting is one of the most effective leadership instru-
ments that a chief executive can use to coordinate and supervise the overall govern-
ment or each administrative agency’s policy initiative. The budgeting process has been
institutionalized by different countries through various historical development process-
es. In Korea, with the foundation of the Republic in 1948, the government adopted an
executive budget system, in which the executive draws up a budget and submits it to
the National Assembly. Approval lies with the National Assembly (Constitution Arti-
cle 54, Clause 2). However, the National Assembly cannot increase the budget for any
item or add new items of expenditure (Article 57). Therefore, the role of the executive
branch in preparing the draft budget is ultimately important. In the process of prepar-
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Figure 3. Number of Staff in the Prime Minister’s Office by Sub-organizations, 1963-2011
Note: Before 1963, there were only a few staff for protocol without a formal organization for the prime minister. The Prime
Mister’s Secretariat and the Office of Government Coordination were merged into the PMO in 2008.
Source: Based on data from Yoo & Lee, 2010; MOGAHA, 1998; and Office of Government Policy Coordination, 2003.
ing an executive budget, the central budget apparatus tries to reflect the president’s
policy directions through its budget review authority.
The central budget apparatus in Korea has greatly changed in organizational con-
figuration in the past 60 years. Its origin was the Ministry of Planning (1948-1955),
which was replaced by the Ministry of Finance (1955-1961), the EPB (1961-1994),
the Board of Finance and Economy (1994-1997), the National Budget Administration
(1998-1999),5 Ministry of Planning and Budget (1999-2008), and finally the Ministry
of Strategy and Finance (2008-present) (figure 4). These frequent changes seem to
indicate that the central budget apparatus had weak durability. However, despite these
organizational changes on the surface, its status as the CA for budgeting was main-
tained all the time.
As mentioned above, the EPB was able to effectively conduct the national develop-
ment plans, including the Five-Year Economic Development Plans, due to its authority
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5. During the short period of 1998-1999, the central budget apparatus was organized as an
outer agency, named the National Budget Administration, with dual affiliations with the
Ministry of Finance and Economy (1988-2008) and the Ministry of Planning and Budget.
Under the reorganization of February 1998, the Board of Finance and Economy, a deputy-
prime-minister-level organization, was downgraded to the Ministry of Finance and Economy
and deprived not only of its deputy prime minister position but also of its authority over
planning, budgeting, and international trade.
Figure 4. Organizational Configuration of the Central Budgeting Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOP = Ministry of Planning; MOF = Ministry of Finance; EPB = Economic Planning Board; BOFE = Board of Finance
and Economy; NBA = National Budget Administration; M(C)OPB = Ministry (Commission) of Planning and Budget;
MOSF = Ministry of Strategy and Finance.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
over both budgeting and policy planning.6 Afterward, the Ministry of Planning and
Budget (1998-2008) became responsible for policy planning and budgeting, leading
the New Public Management reform after the financial crisis of 1997.
The central budget apparatus during the Syngman Rhee administration began as a
small organization with only eight divisions (four for budgeting and four for general
affairs). However, after the 1960s, when the government led economic development
policies, the EPB’s sub-structure became differentiated, and its Budget Bureau was
also greatly expanded. The Budget Bureau or Office changed with the times—shrink-
ing after the early 1980s when administrative reform called for small government,
growing during the late 1980s, and shrinking once more during the early 1990s.
The central budget apparatus in Korea has tried to maintain a longer-term perspec-
tive and approach toward national development, rather than taking on the National
Assembly’s short-term or partisan view on budgeting. Also, the CA has maintained
its image as the last gatekeeper for rational budgeting, as a result securing a strong
legitimacy.
Staffing
Personnel policy is one of the classic instruments that the president employs for
executive leadership. The president tends to want to politicize public officials in his
direction. At the same time, it is expected for the president to ensure their neutrality
and competence. In many countries, the chief executive’s political influence over pub-
lic officials has been restricted with the institutionalization of a merit-based career
civil service system. However, in most cases the chief executive exerts great influence
not only over higher-ranking political appointees but even over career civil servants.
In Korea, the president’s personnel appointments are authorized by the Constitution
and the National Civil Service Act.
In accordance with its legal basis, the president has exercised his authority over
personnel in various ways, inducing public officials to follow his policy directions.
The president has the authority to appoint the prime minister, ministers, vice-ministers,
and heads of administrative apparatuses. He may also exert influence over the person-
nel within each apparatus through the head that he appointed. Since the early 1970s,
when the merit-based career civil service system became institutionalized in earnest,
public officials have been chosen through open competitive recruitment based on their
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6. As indicated earlier, the ministers of the EPB (1961-1994) and its successor, the Board of
Finance and Economy (1994-1998), were given the position of deputy prime minister, a
higher position than that of other ministers.
expertise. This decidedly helped enhance the Korean administration’s neutrality and
competence. However, the president has exerted influence over personnel decisions,
including promotions to high posts and rotation of posts, either directly or indirectly
through heads of agencies.
The first central personnel apparatus was the Examination Committee and the Min-
istry of Government Administration’s (MOGA’s) Personnel Management Bureau,
which were established in 1948 (figure 5). They assisted the president to make person-
nel policy decisions and implement them, respectively. However, a constitutional
amendment in 1955 abolished the Examination Committee, and the MOGA’s Person-
nel Management Bureau was also reduced in size and integrated into a sub-structure of
the State Council Secretariat. As the merit-based career civil service system began to
be institutionalized in the early 1960s, and the presidential executive system was
reestablished, the Personnel Management Office was established within the revived
MOGA (1963-1998) to play the role of central personnel agency.
In order to overcome the financial liquidity crisis that started at the end of 1997, the
Korean government attempted a pro-market public sector reform with the guidance of
the International Monetary Fund. The New Public Management personnel system,
which promoted values such as open competition, contract-based and performance-
related pay system, was gradually introduced, and the Senior Executive System was
institutionalized in 2006 (Jung, 2010). The reform was led in 1998 by the Ministry of
Government Administration and Home Affairs (MOGAHA) and the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).7 In 2008, the newly inaugurated Myung-bak Lee administration
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Figure 5. Organizational Configuration of the Central Personnel Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOGA = Ministry of Government Administration; EC = Examination Committee; SCS = State Council Secretariat;
MOGAHA = Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; CSC = Civil Service Commission; MOPAS =
Ministry of Public Administration and Security.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
aggressively pursued a small-government reform and integrated the CSC and the
MOGAHA to form the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS).
Thus, the central personnel apparatus has been reorganized several times during the
last six decades, so it may seem to have weak durability. However, regardless of its
position and size, it has always existed and played a role to support the president’s per-
sonnel policies.
From 1948 to 1998, with the exception of the Examination Committee (1948-
1955), though the Korean government advocated the institutionalization of a merit-
based career civil service system, there was no formally independent central personnel
apparatus to institutionally support the meritocratic personnel policies—pointing to the
weak legitimacy of the central personnel apparatus. In 1999, the CSC (1999-2008)
was established; notwithstanding its name, it played a role as pilot agency to conduct
pro-market de-bureaucratization reforms (figure 5).
Organizing
Most newly inaugurated presidents pursue administrative reorganization to make
the administrative apparatuses correspond effectively to their policy directions. In this
process, the president also gains the opportunity to seize effective control of the
bureaucracy. In Korea, big and small reorganizations were conducted almost annually,
including major reforms at the beginning of a new administration (figure 6).
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Figure 6. Number of Administrative Apparatuses within the Executive Branch by Organizational
Type, 1948-2011
Note: The Presidential Secretariat and the Prime Minister’s Office are not included in this figure.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
The Korean Constitution (Article 75) stipulates that the government organization
should be decided by law. Based on the Constitution, the National Government Orga-
nization Act determined that the establishment and reorganization of an administrative
apparatus are to be decided by law and the establishment and responsibility are to be
decided by presidential decree (under Article 3 of the National Government Organiza-
tion Act). This legal basis allows the president to carry out his reorganization function.
The National Government Organization Act’s delegation legislated in 1973 further
strengthened the president’s authority over bureau and lower level reorganization.
However, that act’s amendment in 1998 directed ministries to conduct division-level
reorganizations under the ministerial ordinance without the CA’s permission, to pro-
vide autonomy to ministries (MOGAHA, 2001, pp. 169-170).
After the democratic transition in the late 1980s, successive presidents tried to form
reform committees with more participation from civilian experts to make the reform
process more open and democratic and hence strengthen its legitimacy. Even so, in
practice, in the process of drafting a reform bill by a reform committee, usually with
non-permanent members, the CA—which is in charge of reorganization and serves as
the secretariat for the reform committee—has a decisive role. Even after the adminis-
trative reform is drafted, the CA plays an important role—during its approval by the
State Council within the executive branch, and then by the National Assembly, and in
its implementation. It is obvious that the CA will try to reflect the president’s will on
the reform bill by closely working with the PS.
After the transition to democracy in 1987, the role of secretariat was carried out in
various ways. For example, the committee was assisted by the PMO during the
Young-sam Kim administration, the MOPB during the Dae-joong Kim administration,
its own secretariat during the Moo-hyun Roh administration, and the Presidential
Transition Committee under president-elect Myung-bak Lee. By letting other organi-
zations instead of the CA provide organizational management to assist the reform
committees, a president might hope to more effectively pursue his own ideas on reor-
ganization, which are likely to be different from the existing organizational manage-
ment. Even in this case, the alternative assisting apparatus could not be completely
free from the influence of the CA, because it would have to rely on the information
and experience of the CA in charge of organizational management.
In the beginning, the MOGA (1948-1955) was established as a CA in charge of
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7. The MOGAHA was organized by integrating the Ministry of Government Administration
and the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1998. The Civil Service Commission was created in
1999 by enlarging the MOGA’s Personnel Office and related organizations such as the
Central Officials Training Institute.
administrative management in the newly established Korean government. Then in
1961, the Administrative Management Bureau was established within the MOGA,
making more comprehensive and systematic administrative management, including
reorganizations, possible. The CA for organizational management over the whole
administration within the executive branch has maintained its durability through the
MOGA (1963-1998), the MOGAHA (1998-2008), and the MOPAS (2008-present). It
has maintained high legitimacy due to its efforts to enhance administrative efficiency
through reforms, and to play the role of “villain” or the last gatekeeper that restrains
the expansion of government organization.
In regards to complexity, there was no sub-structure for organizational manage-
ment at the beginning of the MOGA. In 1961, the Administrative Management
Bureau was established within the MOGA with four divisions in charge of organiza-
tional management, the personnel system, evaluation analysis, and administrative sta-
tistics. Afterward, functions such as education and training, administrative efficiency,
and government informatization were added. The differentiation of the CA for organi-
zational management occurred the most in the 1970s. Beginning in the 1980s, its func-
tions were merged as the government pursued a small-government policy. Then once
again, the functions of administrative data processing and administrative efficiency
expanded the number of sub-structures, elevating its organizational status to one step
upper the Organization Office (grade I) (figure 7).
Legislation
In Korea, legislation is the National Assembly’s authority, but the executive branch
also has the authority to submit a bill (under Article 52 of the Constitution), and the
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Figure 7. Organizational Configuration of the Organizational Management Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOGA = Ministry of Government Administration; SCS = State Council Secretariat; MOGAHA = Ministry of Govern-
ment Administration and Home Affairs; MOPAS = Ministry of Public Administration and Security.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
president can issue a presidential decree. This explains why the Korean government
has institutionalized a CA that exclusively supports the executive branch’s legislative
work. As of now, the executive branch’s bill submission proceeds as follows: first, a
cabinet ministry drafts a bill, then the Ministry of Government Legislation (MOGL)
examines and complements it, and afterward, the State Council deliberates on it and
then passes it on for the president’s approval. Thus, the president has the opportunity
to conduct and control each administrative apparatus through the process of submit-
ting a bill to the National Assembly or drafting a presidential decree.
The MOGL was established for the first time as a CA under the prime minister in
1948 when the Republic was founded. As the prime minister’s position was abolished
in 1955, however, it was reduced to the Office of Government Legislation within the
Ministry of Justice, then in 1960, under the parliamentary executive system, it was
changed to the Legislation Bureau under the State Council Secretariat. After 1961, it
was restored as the MOGL under the prime minister, a position it has maintained until
today.
The head of the MOGL was not a cabinet member, but was on the same level with
ministers in most administrations—except under President Dae-joong Kim (1998-2003)
and President Myung-bak Lee (2008-present), when the head was a vice-minister-
level position. Even though the head has not been a cabinet member, he or she has had
the authority to participate in cabinet meetings and the right to speak. Regardless of
the head’s status and the change in size or organizational constellation, the MOGL has
maintained its durability. From the 1950s to late 1960s, it had low complexity, but it
became more complex after the late 1980s (figure 8).
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Figure 8. Organizational Configuration of the Legislative Review Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOGL = Ministry of Government Legislation; GLO under MOJ = Government Legislation Office under the Ministry of
Justice; SCS = State Council Secretariat.
Source: MOGA, The History of Government Organization, 1988; MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational
Management, https://org.mopas.go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011)
The legitimacy of the MOGL as a CA lay in its contribution to the legality of
administrative policy-making by pre-examining executive-initiated bills, conventions,
presidential decrees, prime ministerial ordinances, and ministerial ordinances. It main-
tained legitimacy for its function of supervising and coordinating bills submitted by
administrative apparatuses, and of revising these bills after examination if they violat-
ed the Constitution or other laws.
The number of bills reviewed by the MOGL was sparse during state-building peri-
od, but from 1961 to the early 1980s, the numbers increased dramatically (figure 9).
This shows that during the period of rapid government-led industrialization under the
authoritarian government, executive-centered legislation increased. Such trend is fur-
ther proven by the fact that during this period, the number of reviews of presidential
decrees, prime ministerial ordinances, and ministerial ordinances increased, then
decreased during the 1990s after the democratic transition, when there were more
examinations of legislation instead. Also, there were many reviews of bills during
transitions between different political regimes—for example, the military coup d’etat
in 1961, the first peaceful turnover of power by the democratic party in 1998, and the
second peaceful turnover in 2008 by the conservative party—indicating that there were
many reforms at those times.
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Figure 9. Number of Bills Reviewed by the Legislative Review Apparatus, 1948-2009
Note: MOGL = Ministry of Government Legislation; GLO under MOJ = Government Legislation Office under the Ministry of
Justice; SCS = State Council Secretariat.
Source: MOGA, The History of Government Organization, 1988; MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational
Management, https://org.mopas.go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011)
Public Relations
Policy makers apply “symbolic politics” including “rhetorical manipulation of lan-
guage” to enhance political leadership (Edelman, 1964). Successive Korean presidents
have regarded the publicizing function of government as important. All levels of
administrative apparatuses have always maintained a public relations staff or
spokesperson. A senior-level public relations secretary or spokesperson for the presi-
dent himself has always existed, not only in the late 1960s when the presidential secre-
tariat became differentiated and played a larger role, but even when the secretariat
only consisted of a few protocol-centered staff.
In the authoritarian years, presidents actively used the CA in charge of public rela-
tions to censor and control media reports. After the democratic transition, presidents
showed great interest in using the media in different ways. Since Korea’s freedom of
the press was enhanced,8 and election campaigns became fiercely competitive, presi-
dents have used a different approach from that of the authoritarian era, seeking under-
standing and cooperation from the media in more sophisticated ways rather than
applying censorship and control.
Though presidents with their own purpose and method recognized the importance
of public relations, there is no constitutional basis for that function, and the CA
responsible for it has undergone many changes. The Ministry of Public Information
(MOPI) (1948-1955) was established in 1948, but its rank was reduced to Office
(sometimes Bureau) of Public Information, upgraded to MOPI again (1961-1968), and
later merged with the Ministry of Culture as the Ministry of Culture and Public Infor-
mation (1968-1990). Afterward (1990-1998), it became the MOPI again—primarily
because the Ministry of Culture and Information was in charge of too many functions
(including culture, tourism, youth protection, and sports) to manage it efficiently.
When public relations and other functions were integrated into one ministry, the minis-
ter tended to focus more on short-term and sensitive issues related to public relations,
while other longer-term issues, including cultural administration, did not receive much
attention.
The MOPI was greatly diminished, to become the Office of Public Information
(1998-1999) under the PMO, during the first year of the Dae-joong Kim administra-
tion, which pursued small-government reforms. As democratic consolidation proceed-
ed, the negative public perception of the public information function that had been
formed in the past authoritarian period had an effect, too. Thus, the administration
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8. Korea was recently ranked as one of the top countries in the world for freedom of expres-
sion (Reporters without Borders, each year).
deemed it preferable to diminish the public information function and integrate the
overseas public relations with the function of culture-related and tourism-related
administration. Therefore, the public information function was transferred to the Min-
istry of Culture and Public Information. However, it did not take long for the Dae-
joong Kim administration to realize the need for effective public information for gov-
ernance. A year later, the Government Information Agency (1999-2008) was estab-
lished; it was maintained until the Myung-bak Lee administration, in pursuit of a
small-government reform, integrated it to the newly created Ministry of Culture,
Sports, and Tourism (2008-present) (figure 10).
Such numerous changes might indicate a lack of durability of the public relations
function. However, as mentioned above, even during times when the public informa-
tion function was integrated with culture-related administration, it always received
attention from the minister. Therefore, the changes did not significantly affect durabili-
ty, except when the function was demoted to the Office of Public Information under
Prime Minister Jong-pil Kim (1998-1999) during the coalition government. Other than
that, the more serious problem of institutionalization concerned legitimacy: whether a
CA was necessary for domestic publicity in a democratic society.
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Figure 10. Organizational Configuration of the Public Relations Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOPI = Ministry of Public Information; PI = Public Information; SCS = State Council Secretariat; MOCPI = Ministry of
Culture and Public Information; GIA = Government Information Agency; MOCST = Ministry of Culture, Sports and
Tourism.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
Central and Local Relations
The Founding Constitution (Article 117) states that local governments will be
responsible for self-governing administration and the administrative work delegated
by the state, while managing its property, thus opening the possibility for local govern-
ment. However, the Founding Constitution added a provisory clause that the govern-
ment will recognize the authority of local governments “within the scope of law,” so
the constitutional system that places local governments inside the central government
has been maintained.
In 1949, a local government law was passed according to the Founding Constitu-
tion, but its enactment was postponed due to the outbreak of the Korean War. In 1952,
the first local council was created. The local government system was put into effect in
1960 by the government of President Bo-seon Yoon and Prime Minister Myun Chang,
but in 1961, the implementation of local government was suspended by the special
law created by the military coup d’etat. In 1987, the year that democracy was imple-
mented and the Constitution was amended, a local government law was passed. A
local council was formed in 1991, and local governance, which had been put on hold
for 30 years, was revived. The heads of local governments were chosen by direct elec-
tion beginning in 1995. Figure 11 describes the organizational changes of the central-
local relations management apparatus.
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) (1948-1998) was established as the CA to
manage central-local relations; it was responsible for internal security and regional
construction administration (figure 11).9 The Local Government Bureau, which man-
ages central-local relations, had divisions for local administration, finance, promotion,
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Figure 11. Organizational Configuration of Central-Local Relations Management Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: MOHA = Ministry of Home Affairs; MOGAHA = Ministry of Government Administration and Home Affairs; MOPAS =
Ministry of Public Administration and Security.
Source: Based on data from MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management, https://org.mopas.
go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011) and MOGAHA, 1998.
and election, so it was responsible not only for the supervision, finance, and industrial
development of local administrative authorities but also for the management of presi-
dential, general, and local elections. Because of its broad responsibilities, the MOHA
was accused of behaving politically, or even manipulating elections. After the Stu-
dent’s Democratic Uprising of April 19 occurred as a result of the 1960 presidential
election (which was suspected of being rigged), the election-related administration
was transferred to a new independent constitutional apparatus, the National Election
Commission (1963-present).
However, the other functions of the MOHA’s Local Administration Bureau were
maintained during the Park administration, and new functions were added. In 1961,
local tax and inspection divisions were established. Then after the 1970s, the Saemaeul
(New Town) Movement Division was established when the movement to develop
rural areas began in earnest. In 1977 the Local Finance Bureau (with five divisions)
was established, and in 1978 the Regional Development Bureau (with three divisions)
was established, so that the local administration system was reorganized to include
three bureaus, two director-level officials, and 13 divisions. In the 1980s, during the
Chun administration, the Regional Development Bureau was diminished at first as
part of the administration’s attempt to streamline government organization, but it was
restored soon after (MOGAHA, 2001, pp. 91-139). During the authoritarian period,
when the local government system was put on hold, the MOHA played a central role,
appointing all the local administrative heads and civil servants as well as directly con-
trolling local administration while pursuing central government initiatives.
After the democratic transition, the local government system was revived, but local
administrative organizations within the MOHA were expanded further. The Tae-woo
Roh administration (1988-2003) abolished the Regional Development Bureau in
charge of the Saemaeul Movement and instead established the Local Tax Bureau, the
Regional Planning Bureau (with three divisions), and the Regional Economic Bureau
(with four divisions), responding to the revival of local autonomy since 1991. As a
result, the CA for local government affairs expanded to five bureaus and 18 divisions.
However, the Young-sam Kim administration, through its administrative reform to
pursue small government, reduced the local-government-related sub-structure to
three bureaus and 14 divisions. In 1998, the Dae-joong Kim administration maintained
this organization, even when the MOHA was integrated with the MOGA into the
MOGAHA.10 In 2008, the Myung-bak Lee administration reorganized it as the
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9. The management of central-local relations can be regarded as A CA function, as is the case
for the Federal-Provincial Relations Office in the Canadian federal government (Campbell
& Szablowski, 1979).
MOPAS (2008-present), but the local-government-related organization was main-
tained without much change.
Thus, the CA for local government affairs maintained durability, regardless of its
organizational changes. In particular, during the 30 years (1961-1991) when central-
ized government prevailed and local government was put on hold, its autonomy was
maximized. After the democratic transition, such mass-movement-oriented functions
as the Saemaeul Movement were diminished and local autonomy took root. However,
new functions were added in the name of supporting the revival of autonomous local
government, which led to an increase in the number of sub-structures, maintaining
complexity.
As indicated above, the local-government-related apparatuses had a negative repu-
tation for manipulating and rigging elections, for the Syngman Rhee administration
placed the election-related division within the Local Administration Bureau. Even
after 1960, when the election management function was transferred to the National
Election Commission, that negative image as a front for the central government to
control local governments did not disappear. After autonomous local governance was
revived, the CA for local affairs tried to improve legitimacy by changing its image
from one of control to one of support.
Auditing and Inspection
In Korea, one of the effective instruments for presidential leadership is audit and
inspection. Unlike the U.S. Government Accountability Office, which is under the
Congress, or the Taiwanese Yuan of Inspection, which is a fourth branch of govern-
ment, Korea’s audit and inspection functions have been institutionalized under the
president, and therefore have served mainly as a method of internal control by the
president.
The Constitution clearly stipulates that the Board of Audit and Inspection (BAI)
has the right to audit and inspect, and that if a violation of law is found as the result of
an audit, the BAI has to make a judgment on compensation and has the right to request
discipline or prosecute the public servant responsible for the violation. Also, because it
is located directly under the president, it may audit and inspect other agencies’ admin-
istrative work from an advantageous position. Also, BAI personnel have a higher
grade than those in the same positions in other ministries. (For example, BAI division
chiefs are grade 3, while division chiefs in other ministries are grade 4.) In addition,
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10. In the same year, the sub-structure of the MOPAS was reduced to two bureaus and 13
divisions.
the BAI may independently manage its personnel and financial matters. Therefore, it
has maintained a high level of autonomy from the National Assembly and most other
agencies with the exception of the president (figure 12).
When the First Republic was founded in 1948, the CA responsible for auditing and
inspection was launched with a dual structure, with the Board of Audit in charge of
auditing and accounting and the Inspection Committee in charge of inspecting public
officials. The role of the Inspection Committee was reduced to inspecting only lower-
ranking officials in 1955, but restored to including high-ranking officials in 1960. In
1963, the audit and inspection function was integrated to establish the BAI, which has
since been maintained. Thus, the level of institutionalization of the CA for auditing
and inspection was low until 1963, but since then its durability has been high.
However, the BAI has always been challenged by the issue of legitimacy. On the
one hand, since it is directly under the president, it may be regarded as independent
from the cabinet, in the sense of administrative apparatuses subordinate to the prime
minister. On the other hand, as long as it is located under the president, its indepen-
dence from the executive branch is limited. As its record of achievements shows, it
was more active during authoritarian rule than during the democratic era (figure 13).
Thus, the BAI has faced frequent criticism and calls for its transfer to a position inde-
pendent from the executive branch, for example under the National Assembly. How-
ever, the BAI was established based on the Constitution and cannot be transferred
without a constitutional amendment. A compromise that may resolve the indepen-
dence problem is to extend the term of the chair, who is to be appointed by the presi-
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Figure 12. Organizational Configuration of the Controlling Apparatus, 1948-2011
Note: BA = Board of Audit; IC = Inspection Committee; BAI = Board of Audit and Inspection; KICAC = Korea Independent
Commission against Corruption; ACRC = Anti-Corruption and Civil Rights Commission.
Source: Based on data from BAI, 2008; MOPAS, Information System for Government Organizational Management,
https://org.mopas.go.kr/org/external/domain.jsp/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011); and MOGAHA, 1998.
dent with the approval of the National Assembly, from the current four years (with the
possibility of one reappointment) to longer than the president’s term (five years), and
to strengthen the democratic representativeness in the commissioners’ appointment
and term.
CONCLUSION
So far, we have analyzed the institutional change and continuity of the CA since
the foundation of the Republic in Korea. The six decades of institutionalization can be
divided into three phases, based on the percentage of CA among the total administra-
tive apparatuses: high (more than 35 percent), middle (about 20 percent), and low
(about 10 percent) (figure 14). The decrease can be explained by the fact that the num-
ber of CA remained constant while the total number of administrative apparatuses
increased continuously.
From 1948 to 1960, the CA were highly developed in terms of their proportion of the
total number of administrative apparatuses. Administrative resources were extremely
poor during this stage of state-building, because of colonial exploitation under imperi-
alist Japan (1910-1945) and the almost total destruction during the Korean War (1950-
1953). Such a lack of administrative resources made administrative simplification the
most important norm for administrative practice and reform during this period (Cho,
1969; Kim, 1999; Jung, 2004). Even under these circumstances, the Rhee administra-
tion invested substantial resources to institutionalize the CA. As result, President Rhee
could exercise strong executive leadership with the support of highly developed CA as
well as his personal charisma, even though the PS was not highly institutionalized
Institutional Change and Continuity in Korea’s Central Agencies, 1948-2011 43
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Figure 13. Achievements of the Controlling Apparatus, 1949-2007
Source: Based on BAI, 2008.
(Jung, Lee, & Yoo, 2010).
Under the short-lived parliamentary executive system of the Second Republic
(1960-1961), however, the CA were reduced to about 30 percent of all administrative
apparatuses. This made it difficult for the idealist democrat Prime Minister Myun
Chang’s core executive to control the administrative apparatuses, including the mili-
tary. From 1962 to 1972, the proportion of the CA to the total administrative appara-
tuses was further reduced, to less than 20 percent. However, this low proportion was
brought about, not by the reduction of the CA, but by the increase in total administra-
tive apparatuses (figure 6). In fact, a number of new CA were created, including the
EPB. Major General and then President Chung-hee Park initiated many reorganiza-
tions to strengthen the CA in order to control them effectively by standardizing the
(then highly differentiated) economic and industrial policy apparatuses. This trend was
maintained until 2007 (figure 14).
The Myung-bak Lee administration (2008-present) further reduced the proportion
of CA within the executive branch. When the Lee government took office in 2008, it
aggressively conducted small-government-oriented reform, including many integra-
tions of CA with line organizations (figure 14).
Regardless of the changing sizes and organizational configurations of the CA,
however, their roles and influences as core executive apparatuses have mostly been
maintained without many changes, especially since the early 1960s. Even when some
of them were integrated into related line organizations, they maintained, or even
increased, their role and power because of the synergy effects in dealing with other
organizations. A typical example is the budgeting function carried out like an “almighty
mammoth ministry” by the Board of Finance and Economy (1994-1998), which inte-
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Figure 14. Central Agencies as a Percentage of the Total Administrative Apparatuses in the 
Executive Branch, 1948-2011
Note: The central agencies include the PMO. The total administrative apparatuses include all line organizations as well as
all staff organizations such as the central agencies and the Presidential Secretariat. Both categories include all
organizations regardless of the rank of their heads.
grated the EPB and the Ministry of Finance (Jung, 2007). This explanation can also be
applied to the cases of integrating the staffing, organizing, and central-local relations
administrations and the public relations and cultural administrations.
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Figure 15. Background of Personnel in the Central Agencies, 1948-2011
Note: Total CAs include heads and deputy heads of the PMO and the central agencies, excepting heads of the Examina-
tion Commission (1948-1955), two deputy heads of the Ministry of Information (1948-1960), and all deputy heads of
the Ministry of Planning (1948-1955), Ministry of Government Administration (1948-1955), and National Security
Agency (1961-2011), which were omitted because of lack of data.
Public servant includes career civil servants, military personnel, and judicial bureaucrats; politician includes mem-
bers of political parties, the National Assembly, and local councils and chief executives; outside expert includes uni-
versity professors, businessmen, bankers, journalists, and other experts.
Source: Based on data from the National Archives, http://www.archives.go.kr/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011).
Figure 16. Background of Personnel in the Prime Minister’s Office, 1963-2011
Note: All the heads and deputy heads over deputy minister level are included in this figure.
Source: Based on data from the National Archives, http://www.archives.go.kr/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011).
The last but not least point that needs to be indicated is the backgrounds of CA per-
sonnel. During the last 60 years, more than 67 percent, on average, of the heads and
deputy heads of CAs have been former public servants, less than 18 percent have been
former politicians, and about 15 percent have been former outside experts (figure 15).
The proportion of public servants appointed increased under governments of the con-
servative party (1961-1997 and 2008-present), and decreased during governments of
the liberal party (1960-1961 and 1998-2007) (figures 15, 16, and 17). Deputy heads of
the CA have been mostly career public servants (figure 18). As a whole, the predomi-
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Figure 17. Background of Heads of Central Agencies, 1948-2011
Source: Based on data from the National Archives, http://www.archives.go.kr/ (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011).
Figure 18. Background of Deputy Heads of Central Agencies, 1948-2011
Source: Based on data from the National Archives (http://www.archives.go.kr) (accessed January 10-February 8, 2011).
nance of public servants backgrounds in the CA leadership seems to have oriented
Korea’s policy direction strongly toward long-term, consistent, and plan rationality
rather than short-term, flexible, and democratic responsiveness.
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